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1.  Introduction  
Innovating firms choose to patent their innovations when patenting allows the appropriation of more 
rents than do other forms of intellectual property protection (e.g., trade secrecy). The degree of 
appropriability of innovation rents enabled by a patent is mainly defined by two elements – patent 
length and patent breadth (Merges and Nelson 1990, Klemperer 1990). While the innovator cannot 
affect patent length since it is standardized and predetermined by law (i.e., 20 years for most 
patents) he plays a crucial role in the determination of the breadth of protection granted to the 
patent. The innovator’s claims in the patent application specify the breadth of protection sought for 
the innovation and constitute the basis on which the Patent Office decides on the breadth of 
protection granted to the patent, if any, and the courts rule on patent validity and infringement 
issues (Merges and Nelson 1990, Miller and Davis 1990, Cornish 1989).  
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically examine the innovator’s optimal patent breadth 
strategy; the patent breadth choice that maximizes the innovator’s ability to appropriate innovation 
rents. The analysis of the innovator’s patenting behavior in the existing economic literature has 
primarily focused on the innovator’s decision to patent the innovation or to keep it a secret 
(Horstmann et al. 1985, Waterson 1990). Lerner (1995) empirically examined some other aspects of 
the innovator’s patenting behavior, namely, the decision to patent in certain patent subclasses given 
competitors’ patent subclass choices and legal costs. There is no formal framework of analysis of 
the innovators’ patent breadth choice once the decision to patent has been made, however. Instead, 
it has been traditionally assumed that the innovator has an incentive to claim ‘as much as possible’ 
(Lenz 1988).  
  Our paper explicitly models the innovator’s patent breadth decision and examines the 
optimal patent breadth strategy that the innovator should employ when faced with entry by products  
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of superior quality and the possibility that the breadth of the patent will be legally challenged. 
Patent breadth is defined in terms of the area in a vertically differentiated product space that the 
patent protects. The theoretical model developed considers the efficiency of patent breadth as an 
entry deterrent. As a consequence, the model also explicitly examines the assumption that the 
innovator has an incentive to claim the broadest scope of patent protection possible. 
Analytical results show that in most cases the optimal patent breadth strategy for the 
innovator is to claim a patent breadth which is less than the maximum possible. The analysis also 
shows that that it is possible under some conditions for an innovator to use patent breadth to deter 
entry – when this is possible, the optimal patent strategy is to always deter entry. These conditions 
occur under certain combinations of the entrant’s R&D effectiveness and trial cost values (i.e., low 
R&D effectiveness – which results in high R&D costs – and high trial costs). When these specific 
conditions do not hold, the optimal strategy for the innovator is to allow a new competitor to enter 
the market. When allowing entry, the innovator chooses patent breadth so that the benefits of 
increased product differentiation that result from greater patent breadth are traded off with the 
increased likelihood of patent challenge and invalidation that comes with greater patent breadth. 
One of the conclusions of the paper is that the innovator will choose the maximum patent breadth 
when patent infringement is never an optimal strategy for the entrant. The innovator may also 
choose maximum patent breadth when entry deterrence is not possible and it is optimal for the 
innovator to induce patent infringement. This occurs under a very specific set of conditions (i.e., a 
combination of very low R&D effectiveness values and low monopoly profits). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two gives a background discussion of 
the relationship between patent breadth and innovation rents and outlines inefficiencies related to 
the patent granting process. Section three describes the theoretical development of the strategic 
patent breadth model; it describes the market conditions, defines patent breadth and models the  
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choice of patent breadth as a sequential game of complete information. Section four provides the 
analytical solution of the model. Finally, section five concludes the paper. 
2.  Background 
The innovator’s patent breadth choice is a strategic decision. Patent breadth defines the 
technological territory claimed and protected by the patent. It plays an important role in the 
determination of the degree of competition in the market and the effective patent life, which in turn 
determine the true reward to the innovator. On the one hand, the greater is the breadth of patent 
protection, the harder it is for potential competitors to enter into the patentee’s market with non-
infringing innovations and thus, the longer the patentee can maintain the limited monopoly that the 
patent grants (Gallini 1992). At the same time, however, a patent that is too broad increases the 
likelihood of both infringement and patent validity challenges by competitors and/or third parties 
(Merges and Nelson 1990). Consequently, broad patent protection may reduce the effective patent 
life, and thus the innovation rents that can be captured with the patent, as patents may be revoked 
during infringement trials and patent validity challenges (Barton 2000). This concern is especially 
critical in light of the increase in patent litigation during the last decades, particularly in the field of 
biotechnology, and the increase in the number of patents that are invalidated after being challenged 
(Barton 2000, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001, Harhoff and Reitzig 2000). Thus, a broad patent 
protection may impede the innovator’s ability to safeguard and/or defend the technological territory 
protected by his patent.  
  The assumption that the innovator has an incentive to follow a ‘claim as much as possible’ 
strategy is mainly based on the premise of an efficiently operating Patent Office that will prune 
back or reject broad and/or erroneous claims during the patent granting process. If the Patent Office 
could grant an ‘optimal’ patent then the innovator would be better off claiming broad patent  
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protection as the patent breadth granted cannot be greater than the patent breadth claimed. Evidence 
shows, however, that the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) often grants broad 
patents that cannot survive a validity attack and patents that appear to overlap leading to disputes 
that have to be resolved through costly litigation or settlement (Voss 1999, Barton 2000, Lenz 1988, 
Lerner 1994). Barton (2000) claims that, due to the increase in patent applications over the last 
decade and resources limitations in the USPTO, patent examiners spend on average only twenty 
five to thirty hours examining a patent application, time that is not enough to conduct effective 
searches and evaluate patent claims.  
The inefficiencies present in the patent granting process suggest that the innovator cannot 
always rely on the Patent Office for help in refining his patent claims. This is especially true for 
pioneering/drastic innovations. According to the Patent Office’s policy, drastic innovations are 
usually granted broader protection (EPO 2000, USPTO 1999).
1 Merges and Nelson (1990) observe 
that claims to drastic innovations are often allowed to cover areas beyond the area examined and 
disclosed by the innovator while the narrowing of the claims of drastic innovations is usually left to 
the courts.
2  
  Existing patent breadth studies have mainly focused on the determination of a socially 
optimal patent policy and have thus assumed an efficient patent granting process (Gilbert and 
Shapiro 1990, Klemperer 1990, Gallini 1992, Green and Scotchmer 1995, Chang 1995, Matutes et. 
al 1996, O’ Donughue 1998). In these studies, a regulator (e.g., Patent Office) determines a socially 
optimal patent breadth; a patent breadth that rewards the innovator/patentee ‘sufficiently’ at the 
least social costs.    
                                                 
1 According to the European Patent Office (EPO) (2000) ‘an invention that opens up a whole new field is entitled to 
more generality in the claims than an invention that is concerned with advances in a known field of technology’.  
2 This is due to the fact that the more drastic is the innovation, the harder it is for an examiner to find support in the prior 
art to object to broad claims demonstrating that embodiments of the claimed invention would be impossible to make 
without undue experimentation. Thus, when drastic innovations are concerned, the burden falls on the examiner who 
must disprove enablement (Merges and Nelson 1990).  
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  This paper follows a different approach. We seek to determine a privately rather than a 
socially optimal breadth of patent protection. In our analysis the innovator determines the breadth of 
patent protection claimed that maximizes his ability to appropriate innovation rents given the 
inefficiencies present in the patent granting process. Our analysis focuses on drastic product 
innovations; innovations that generate new demand or meet demand not previously met. The focus 
is on drastic innovations because, the Patent Office’s role in refining the innovator’s patent claims is 
limited and the innovation rents that are at stake are substantial increasing the probability of a patent 
challenge (Cornish 1989, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). Consequently, the innovator, in our 
model, does not rely on the Patent Office to structure his claims. He is aware of both the 
inefficiencies in the determination of patent breadth in the Patent Office and that his effort to 
safeguard his technological territory does not usually conclude with the granting of the patent.  
  The section that follows describes the theoretical development of the strategic patent breadth 
model.  
3.  The Strategic Patent Breadth Model 
3.1 Model  Assumptions 
The model is based on a number of assumptions. The optimal patent breadth strategy is determined 
in a sequential game of complete information. The agents in the game are an incumbent/patentee 
who, having invented a patentable drastic product innovation and having decided to seek patent 
protection, decides on the patent breadth claimed and a potential entrant who decides on whether to 
enter the patentee’s market and, if entry occurs, where to locate in a vertically differentiated product 
space. Both the incumbent and the entrant are risk neutral and maximize profits. It is assumed that 
the regulator (e.g., Patent Office) always grants the patent as claimed; thus, the regulator is not 
explicitly modeled. The assumption that the Patent Office plays no role in refining the patent claims  
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is a realistic assumption for drastic innovations. 
  The patentee’s investment decision that led to the development of a new product is not 
examined – this decision is treated as exogenous to the game. In addition, it is assumed that the 
patentee and the entrant each produce at most one product and that the entrant does not patent her 
product since further entry is not anticipated (see footnote 4 below). The production process for the 
entrant is assumed to be deterministic, so that once the entrant chooses a location she can produce 
the chosen product with certainty. It is also assumed there is no time lag between making and 
realizing a decision. 
  The patentee and the entrant, if she enters, operate in a vertically differentiated product 
market that can support at most two products. Consumers differ according to some attribute λ ,  
uniformly distributed with unit density  1 ) ( = λ f  in the interval  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ λ , each buying one unit of 
either the patentee’s or the entrant’s product but not both. The patentee is assumed to have 
developed a product that provides consumers with utility  p p p p q V U − + = λ , where V is a base 
level of utility,  p q  is the quality of the patentee’s product  p p  is the price of the product produced 
by the patentee. The entrant’s product has quality  p e q q > , ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ e q , that provides consumers with 
utility  e e e p q V U − + = λ , where  e p  is the price of the entrant’s product. Without affecting the 
qualitative nature of the model, the quality of the patentee’s product  p q  is set equal to zero (i.e., 
0 = p q ). As a result, the entrant’s quality  e q  is interpreted as the difference in quality between her 
product and that of the patentee, or more generally as the distance the entrant has located away from 
the patentee.
3 
                                                 
3 With       qp ≠ 0 , equation (1) becomes 





. Since the quality difference,    qe −q p, in the denominator is the 
relevant parameter of interest in the subsequent analysis, the assumption that      qp =0 can be made to ease the notation  
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 Product  i ( e p i , = ) is consumed as long as  0 ≥ i U  and  j i U U > . It is assumed that V is 
large enough so that  e p i p V i , = ∀ ≥  and the market is always served by at least one product. The 
consumer who is indifferent between the two products has a λ denoted by 
* λ , where 
* λ  is 









* λ  
Since each consumer consumes one unit of the product of her choice, the demand for the products 
produced by the patentee and the entrant are given by 
* λ = p y  and 
* 1 λ − = e y , respectively. 
  The patentee has already incurred the development costs associated with the product quality 
that he has patented. Thus, the R&D costs for the patentee are sunk. For the entrant, however, 
market entry can only occur if she develops a higher quality product. To do so, she incurs R&D 






F β =  and 
9
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≥ β . The restriction on the parameter β  ensures that the 
quality chosen by the entrant,  e q , is bounded between zero and one. Note that with this formulation, 
0 ) ( > ′ e e q F  and  0 ) ( > ′ ′ e e q F , thus, it is increasingly costly for the entrant to locate away from the 
patentee in the one-dimensional product space (i.e., to produce the better quality product). In 
addition, since  e q  represents the quality difference between the patentee’s and the entrant’s product 
the filing of a patent by the patentee provides the entrant with knowledge of how to produce the 
patentee’s product (i.e.,  0 ) ( = p e q F  – the assumption of perfect information disclosure by the patent 
is made). The R&D costs are assumed sunk once they have been incurred and neither the patentee 
nor the entrant find it optimal to relocate once they have chosen their respective qualities. Once the 
R&D costs are incurred, production of the products by both the patentee and the entrant occur at 
                                                                                                                                                                  




  The patent breadth claimed and granted to the patentee’s product is denoted by b  and it 
defines the area in the one-dimensional product space that the patent protects, thus,  ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b . Patent 
breadth values close to zero indicate protection of the patented innovation only against duplication. 
It is assumed that when the entrant locates at a distance  b qe <  away from  p q  a trial always takes 
place, either because the patentee files an infringement lawsuit or because the entrant directly 
challenges the validity of the patent. It is further assumed that the filing of an infringement lawsuit 
is always met with a counterclaim by the accused infringer that the patent is invalid.
5 The costs 
incurred during the infringement trial/validity attack by the patentee and the entrant are denoted by 
P C  and  E C , respectively. These costs are assumed to be independent of the breadth of protection 
and of the entrant’s location. The trial costs will only be incurred if  b qe <  and they are assumed to 
be sunk − once made they cannot be recovered by either party.
6  
The patent system being modeled is assumed to be that of the fencepost type, in which 
patent claims define an exact border of protection. Under the fencepost system, infringement will 
always be found when an entrant locates within the patentee’s claims, unless the entrant proves that 
the patent is invalid (Cornish 1989).
7 In the fencepost system the probability that infringement is 
found does not depend on how close the entrant has located to the patentee. The implication of 
                                                 
4 Note that the market conditions outlined above imply that the Finiteness Property introduced by Shaked and Sutton 
(1982) holds; products are vertically differentiated, the burden of quality improvements falls on fixed rather than on 
variable costs and the unit variable costs increase in quality slower than the willingness to pay for quality – ∀ λ>0.  
Thus, this market will be concentrated irrespective of its size and the level of fixed costs. Moreover, given the 
assumption that consumer preferences are such that the market can support at most two products this market is a natural 
duopoly.  
5 This is a standard defence adopted by accused infringers (Cornish 1989, Merges and Nelson 1990).  
6 With this assumption we exclude the possibility of the court awarding lawyers’ fees to either party.  
7 In contrast, a signpost patent system implies that claims provide an indication of protection and the claims are 
interpreted using the doctrines of equivalents and reverse equivalents. Under a signpost system the closer the entrant 
locates to the patentee the easier it is to prove infringement using the doctrine of equivalents. In addition, infringement 
may be found even when the entrant locates outside the patentee’s claims using the doctrine of reverse equivalents.   
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assuming a fencepost patent system is that the probability that infringement will be found (given 
that the entrant has located at  b qe <  distance away from  p q ) is equal to the probability that the 
validity of the patent will be upheld. Thus, the fencepost patent system implies that the events that 
the patent is found to be infringed and that the patent is found to be invalid can be treated as 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
8  
Patent validity is directly linked to patent breadth. In general, the broader is the patent 
protection, the harder it is to show novelty, nonobviousness and enablement (Miller and Davis 
1990). Thus, the broader is patent protection the harder it is to establish validity. In addition, 
evidence from the literature shows that courts tend to uphold narrow patents and invalidate broad 
ones (Waterson 1990, Cornish 1989, Merges and Nelson 1990). To capture this element, the 
probability that the patent will be found to be valid or equivalently that infringement will be found, 
denoted by  ) (b µ , is assumed to be inversely related to patent breadth,  0 ) ( < ′ b µ . 
3.2  The  Game 
The strategic patent breadth game consists of three stages. In the first stage of the game, the 
patentee applies for a patent, claiming a patent breadth, b . In the second stage of the game, a 
potential entrant observes the patentee’s product and the breadth of protection granted to it and 
chooses whether or not to enter the market. If the entrant does not enter she earns zero profits while 
the patentee operates as a monopolist in the third stage of the game and earns monopoly profits 
M
p Π . If the entrant enters, she does so by choosing the quality  e q  of her product relative to that of 
the patentee. This decision determines whether the entrant infringes the patent or not. 
  If the entrant chooses a quality greater than or equal to the patent breadth claimed by the 
                                                 
8 Note that, our analysis and results are not affected by whether only certain claims are invalidated during the 
infringement/validity trial or the entire patent; that is, when patent breadth is narrowed rather than the entire patent 
revoked. This occurs because further entry is not anticipated in our model (see footnote 4).   
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patentee (i.e.,  b qe ≥ ), then no infringement occurs, and she and the patentee compete in prices in 
the third stage of the game and earn duopoly profits 
NI
e Π  and 
NI
p Π , respectively. If the entrant 
locates inside the patent breadth claimed by the patentee (i.e.,  b qe < ), the patent is infringed and a 
trial occurs in which the validity of the patent is examined. With probability  ) (b µ , the patent is 
found to be valid (i.e., infringement is found), the entrant is not allowed to market her product and 
the patentee operates as a monopolist in the third stage of the game. With probability  ) ( 1 b µ − , the 
patent is found to be invalid, and the entrant and the patentee compete in prices. The payoffs for the 
patentee and the entrant when the entrant chooses  b qe <  are  ) (
I
e E Π  and  ) (
I
p E Π , respectively. 







The solution to this game is found by backward induction. The third stage of the game in which the 
patentee and the entrant – when applicable – compete in prices is examined first, followed by the 
Patentee: chooses patent 
breadth b  
Stage one  
       Entrant   Stage two  
Not Enter    Enter 
 Not infringe -  b qe ≥  
µ





p p Π =
* π  
E: 
NI
e e Π =
* π  
P:  ) (
* I
p p E Π = π  
E:  ) (
* I






p p Π =
* π  
E:  0
* = e π  
Payoffs: A  Payoffs: C  Payoffs: B 
Entrant: chooses product 
quality  e q  
µ − 1  
Figure 1. The Game in Extensive Form  
12
second stage in which the entrant makes her entry decision, and then the first stage in which the 
patentee makes his decision regarding patent breadth.  
4.  Analytical Solution of the Game 
4.1  Stage 3 – The Pricing Decisions 
In the third stage of the game, two cases must be considered – the case where the entrant has 
entered and the case where the entrant has not entered. Considering the last case first, in the absence 
of entry by the entrant, the patentee will charge  V pp =  and earn monopoly profits  p
M
p F V − = Π . 
  If entry occurs, the problem facing duopolist i is to choose price  i p  to maximize profit 














= . Recall that the R&D costs, 
p F  and  e F  for the patentee and the entrant, respectively, are assumed to be sunk at this stage in the 
game. The Nash equilibrium in prices, as well as the resulting outputs and profits, are given by: 





p = , 
3





= π  





p = , 
3





= π  
  Since the entrant has the higher quality product, she charges the higher price. Profits are 
increasing in the distance  e q  between the patentee’s and the entrant’s location. The greater is the 
difference in quality between the two products, the less intense is competition at the final stage of 
the game and the greater are the profits for both the incumbent and the entrant.
9  
                                                 
9 This is a well-established result in the product differentiation literature in simultaneous games. When competitors first 
simultaneously choose their locations in the product space and then compete in prices they choose maximum 
differentiation to relax competition in the pricing stage that would curtail their profits (Lane 1980, Motta 1993, Shaked 
and Sutton 1982).  
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4.1  Stage 2 – The Location Decision 
As outlined above, the entrant must choose one of three options – Not Enter, Enter and Not Infringe 
the Patent, or Enter and Infringe the Patent. For any given patent breadth, b , the entrant will choose 
the option that generates the greatest profit. 
  The outcome of the Not Enter option is straightforward – the entrant earns zero profits. The 
outcomes of the other two options depend on a number of factors, including patent breadth, R&D 
costs and trial costs. The benefits and costs associated with the Enter and Not Infringe option are 
examined below, followed by an examination of the benefits and costs associated with the Enter and 
Infringe option. Once the net benefits of each option are formulated, the most desirable option for 
the entrant is determined for any given patent breadth.  
  Entry with No Infringement ( b qe ≥ ) 
For the entrant to enter without infringing the patent, the entrant must choose a quality location that 
is greater than or equal to the patent breadth – i.e.,  b qe ≥ . Let 
*
e q  be the optimal quality the entrant 
would choose when the patent breadth is not binding, where 
*
e q  solves the following problem: 










β π − = − = Π  
Optimization of equation (4) yields the optimal quality 
*
e q : 
(5)  
β 9
4 * = e q  
Equation (5) indicates that the less costly it is to produce the better quality product (i.e., the smaller 
is β ), the further away from the incumbent the entrant locates. 
  As long as  b qe ≥
* , the patent breadth does not affect the location chosen by the entrant, 
since the entrant can choose her optimal quality without fear of infringement. Thus, patent breadth  
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will only be binding if  b qe <
* . Since an increase in quality beyond 
*
e q  results in a reduction in 
profits, the entrant’s profit is decreasing in  e q  for all 
*
e e q q > . As a result, the entrant, when faced 
with a binding patent breadth, will always choose a quality equal to the patent breadth chosen by the 
patentee (i.e.,  b qe = ). 
  Thus, a profit-maximizing entrant that wishes to not infringe the patent will choose her entry 
location 
NI
e q  as follows: 
 (6)   



















while the profits earned by the entrant are: 
(7)  


























  Entry with Infringement ( b qe < ) 
If the entrant enters and infringes the patent filed by the patentee, a trial takes place. If the patent is 
found to be valid during trial, the entrant cannot enter and the patentee has a monopoly position in 
the market. If the patent is found to be invalid, the entrant is allowed to market her product and the 
patentee and the entrant operate as duopolists. The probability that the patent is found to be valid is 
given by  ) (b µ , with  ) (b µ  having the functional form  b b α µ − =1 ) ( .
10 Thus,  b b α µ = − ) ( 1  is the 
probability that the patent will be found to be invalid. For an given patent breadth, the greater is the 
                                                 
10 Patent breadth is not the only factor affecting the validity of the patent. A patent may also be invalidated because of 
unallowable amendments during patent examination and because the innovation is not regarded an invention under the 
patent law (Cornish 1989). By assuming that the innovator has generated a patentable innovation we have excluded the 
latter case. To keep the analysis simple we assume that the probability of patent invalidation due to unallowable 
amendments is negligible.   
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validity parameter α , the greater is the probability that the patent will be found invalid. With this 
background, the quality chosen by the entrant is determined by solving: 
(8)   max
qe
E Πe
















e =   
Equation (9) shows that when the entrant infringes the patent she finds it optimal to locate at a 
distance proportional to the breadth of the patent. Because there is uncertainty with respect to 
whether the entrant will be able to continue in the market, she ‘underlocates’; to reduce the R&D 
costs, which are incurred with certainty, the entrant locates closer to the patentee than she would 
have done had infringement not been a possibility.  
The expected profits for the entrant are given by equation (10): 







When patent breadth is negligible (i.e., b  approaches zero), the expected profits from infringement 
approach  e C − , since the probability of the patent being found valid approaches one. As patent 
breadth increases, expected profits from infringement also increase, a reflection of the rising 
probability that the patent will be found invalid. 
The Entry/Infringement Decision 
The decision made by the entrant whether to enter, and if entry occurs, whether to infringe the 
patent, depends on patent breadth, b , and three variables that are treated as exogenous in this study 
– the R&D cost parameter β , the trial costs  e C  and the validity parameter α . As shown above, 
when patent breadth is such that 
*
e q b ≤  the entrant always finds it profitable to enter the market  
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locating at her most preferred location (
*
e q ) without triggering the trial outcome. For patent breadth 
values such that 
*
e q b > , however, the entrant may be deterred from entering the market or, if entry 
cannot be deterred, she may always finds it profitable to enter without infringing the patent or she 
may enter and be induced to either infringe or not infringe the patent. These cases where 
*
e q b >  are 
examined below.  
Case I – Entry Deterrence  
The entrant can be deterred from entering the market when there exists a, b ˆ, where b ˆ  ensures that 
the following conditions are satisfied:  0 ) ˆ ( ≤ Π b
NI
e ; 0 )) ˆ ( ( ≤ Π b E
I
e  and  ] 1 , ( ˆ *
e q b∈ . In fact, there 
might be a range of patent breadths that deter entry. Define  I b ˆ  as the patent breadth that makes the 
entrant indifferent between entering the market and infringing the patent on the one hand and not 
entering the market on the other hand. Then  I b ˆ  must ensure that the following conditions are met: 
0 )) ˆ ( ( = Π I
I
e b E  and  ] 1 , ( ˆ *
e I q b ∈ .
11 Also, define  NI b ˆ  as the patent breadth that makes the entrant 
indifferent between entering the market without infringing the patent on the one hand and not 
entering the market on the other hand. Then  NI b ˆ  must satisfy the following conditions: 
0 ) ˆ ( = Π NI
NI
e b  and  ] 1 , ( ˆ *







b =  and 
β 9
8 ˆ = NI b ; 
since ] 1 , ( ˆ *
e NI q b ∈ ,  NI b ˆ  exists only for β  values such that 
9
8
≥ β . Given the above, any  ] 1 , (
*
e q b∈  
such that  I b b ˆ ≤  makes entry under infringement unprofitable for the entrant while any  ] 1 , (
*
e q b∈  
such that  NI b b ˆ ≥  makes entry under no infringement unprofitable for the entrant. Thus, the entrant 
                                                 
11 The assumption is made that when the entrant is indifferent she will not enter.   
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will not find it profitable to enter the market if a  ] 1 , ( ˆ *
e q b∈  such that  I NI b b b ˆ ˆ ˆ ≤ ≤  exists. Case I is 
illustrated in Figure 2, panels (i) and (ii). 
Case II – Entry and No Infringement 
The entrant will always enter and not infringe when the entrant’s trial costs and R&D effectiveness 
are such that, ] 1 , (
*




e E Π > Π  and  0 > Π
NI
e . Case II is illustrated in Figure 2, panel (iii). 
Case III – Entry and Inducement of Infringement/Non Infringement 
Let b
~
 be the patent breadth that makes the entrant indifferent between infringing and not infringing 
the patent, while still generating positive profits for the entrant – i.e.,  ] 1 , (
~ *









e . The entrant will enter and not infringe when  ]
~
, 0 ( b b∈ , while the entrant 
will enter and infringe when  ] 1 ,
~
(b b∈  (the assumption is made that when the entrant is indifferent 
she will choose to not infringe the patent). The expression for b
~
 is derived in the Appendix.  
 The  patent  breadth  b
~
 is a function of the R&D effectiveness parameter, β , the validity 
parameter, α , and the trial costs  e C . The relationship between b
~
 and the above parameters is such 
that, the greater are the costs of producing the higher quality product, the greater is the validity 
parameter and the smaller are the trial costs, the smaller is the breadth of the patent that makes the 

























≥ β , ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ α  and  0 ≥ e C  (for a proof see the Appendix). The above results occur 
because, the more costly it is to produce the better quality product, the closer the entrant is forced to 
locate to the patentee and the smaller is the breadth of patent protection that makes it unprofitable 
for the entrant to not infringe the patent. In addition, the greater is the value of the validity 
parameter, the greater is the effect that patent breadth has on the probability that the validity of the  
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patent will be upheld and the smaller is the patent breadth that makes it profitable for the entrant to 
infringe the patent. Finally, the greater are the trial costs, the less appealing is infringement to the 
entrant. The entrant in this case will infringe only if the breadth is so large that her cost structure 
does not allow her to locate outside the patentee’s patent claims. Case III is illustrated in Figure 2, 
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Figure 2. The Entrant’s Profits under Infringement and No Infringement When  
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Figure 3 illustrates the combinations of β  and  e C  values, for a given α  value, ( 5 . 0 = α ) that give 
rise to each of the three cases. Entry deterrence (Case I), where there exists a patent breadth b ˆ such 
that  I NI b b b ˆ ˆ ˆ ≤ ≤ , is represented by the dotted area on Figure 3 and occurs for relatively high trial 
costs,  e C , and high β  (low R&D effectiveness) values. Entry with no infringement (Case II), 
where there is no patent breadth b ˆ that can deter entry and no patent breadth b
~
 that can induce non 
infringement, is represented by the horizontally hatched area in Figure 3 and occurs for relatively 
high trial costs  e C , and low β  (high R&D effectiveness) values. Finally, entry and inducement of 
infringement/no infringement (Case III), where there exists a patent breadth b
~
 such that 







= b  
NI I b b ˆ ˆ =  
Case I: ∃ b ˆ Case II: ∃b ˆ, ∃b
~  
Case III: 








Figure 3. Combinations of β and Ce values for a given α value (α=0.5) that generate Cases I,   
       II and III  
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  As demonstrated in Figure 4, the validity parameter α  affects the precise combination of β  
and  e C  values that gives rise to a particular case. Specifically, the larger is α , the smaller is the 
parameter area in which the entrant will enter and not infringe the patent (the area to the left of 
locus  1
~






[ ∈ β ), and the smaller is the parameter area that can deter entry (the area 
to the right of locus  NI I b b ˆ ˆ =  and for 
9
8
≥ β ). These results follow directly from the impact that α  
has on the probability that the validity of the patent will be upheld during trial, µ . As α  becomes 
larger, the greater is the probability that the patent will be found invalid, for any given patent 
breadth, b . As a consequence, entry is harder to deter and when entry does occur, the entrant is less 
likely to not infringe the patent. 
 
Figure 4. Combinations of β and Ce values that give rise to Cases I, II and II, for    
       α=1, α=0.75 and α=0.25 
1 = α  
75 . 0 = α  
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The relationship between the existence of a patent breadth  ] 1 , ( ˆ *
e q b∈  that can deter entry and a 
patent breadth  ] 1 , (
~ *
e q b ∈  the makes the entrant indifferent between infringing and not infringing the 
patent is formally described in the propositions that follow.  
Proposition 1. If a  ] 1 , (
~ *
e q b ∈  and a  ] 1 , ( ˆ *
e q b∈  do not exist it is never optimal for the entrant to 
infringe the patent. 
Proof: 
At the entrant’s most preferred location 
*
e q  non infringement is always more profitable than 
infringement for the entrant. That is, for 
β 9















e C E  ∀ 
9
4
≥ β ∧ ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ α ∧ 0 ≥ e C . In addition, at 
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≥ β . The above conditions imply 
that if a  ] 1 , (
~ *









e ∀ ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b  which implies that 
NI
e Π > ) (
I
e E Π ∀ ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b . Since there is no 
] 1 , ( ˆ *
e q b∈  either there is no  NI b ˆ  such that  0 = Π
NI
e  which implies that  0 > Π
NI
e ∀ ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b . This 
result is depicted in Figure 2 in panel (iii) and in Figure 3 as the horizontally hatched area.    
Proposition 2. If a  ] 1 , (
~ *
e q b ∈  does not exist, the only patent breadth  ] 1 , ( ˆ *
e q b∈  that can deter entry 
is the patent breadth that satisfies the non-entry condition under no infringement, i.e.,  NI b ˆ  . 
Proof: 
From Proposition 1 it is known that for 
*




e . If b
~
 that makes 










E Π >) (
I
E E Π . If there is a 
patent breadth  NI b ˆ  that satisfies the non-entry condition under no infringement this implies that for  
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NI b b ˆ =  0 ≤ Π
NI
E . Given that 
NI
E Π >) (
I
E E Π , when  NI b b ˆ =  the entry deterrence condition is also 
satisfied. Thus, any  ] 1 , ˆ [ NI b b∈  can deter entry. This case is depicted in Figure 2 in panel (ii).   
4.2  Stage 1 – The Patent Breadth Decision 
In stage 1 of the game, the patentee chooses the patent breadth b that maximizes profit, given his 
knowledge of the entrant’s behavior in the second stage of the game. Since the entrant’s behavior 
depends on the values of Ce, α and β, the patent breadth chosen by the patentee also depends on 
these parameters. Specifically, three situations are possible, each one corresponding to one of the 
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Figure 5. The Patentee’s Strategic Patent Breadth Decision  
Entry can be deterred 
and b ˆ exists  
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Scenario A – Choose Patent Breadth to Deter Entry 
If there are values of β ,  α  and  e C  are such that entry can be deterred – i.e., if there exists a 
] 1 , ( ˆ *
e q b∈  – then the patentee should always choose to deter entry. By deterring entry, the patentee 
earns monopoly profits 
M
p Π . Since these profits are higher than what can be earned under a 
duopoly, the patentee always finds it optimal to deter entry. 
Scenario B – Choose Maximum Patent Breadth 
When the values of β , α  and  e C  are such that the entrant will always enter and not infringe the 
patent, regardless of the patent breadth (i.e., case II), the patentee always chooses the maximum 
patent breadth. The reasoning is straightforward. With both firms operating in the market, the 





= π  (see 
equation (2)). As equation (5) indicates, the entrant will choose  b qe =  for 
β 9
4
≥ b . Thus, the 
patentee can earn maximum profits by choosing the largest possible patent breadth, which in turn 
causes the entrant to chose the largest possible value of  e q .  
Scenario C – Allow Entry and Induce Either Infringement or Non Infringement 
If the values of β , α  and  e C   are such that the entrant will enter and either infringe or not infringe 
depending on patent breadth, the patentee must decide whether to induce infringement or not. 
Consider first the profits the patentee earns if he induces the entrant to not infringe. Recall from 





= π  when the entrant enters without infringing. 





e q  if 
β 9
4
< b , while the  
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entrant chooses  b q
NI
e =  when 
β 9
4
≥ b . Thus, if the patentee induces non infringement, his profits 
are given by: 
















    if 
4
9β
≤ b< ˜  b 
 
Since the patentee’s profits can always be increased by choosing 
β 9
4
≥ b , the patentee can earn 
maximum profits and not induce infringement by choosing  b b
NI ~
= . The patentee’s profits are 
thus: 




p = Π . 
  The profits earned from inducing non infringement have to be compared to the expected 







e =  when she enters 
and infringes the patent, and that the probability of the patent being found valid is  b α µ − =1.  T h e  
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 The  patent  breadth  b  that solves equation (13) does not result in maximum profits for the 













p . Thus, the 
optimal patent breadth 
I b  that induces infringement is one of the corner values – i.e.,  e b b
I + =
~
 or  
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1 =
I b . Note, however, that under this scenario the patent breadth chosen must violate the entry 
deterrence condition, that is,  NI
I
I b b b ˆ ˆ < < . When  1 =
I b  the condition  NI
I
I b b b ˆ ˆ < <  holds only for 





< ≤ β . With  1 =
I b , the patentee’s expected profits are: 
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while with  e b b
I + =
~
, the expected profits are: 
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  Assuming the patentee induces infringement, the patentee chooses  1 =
I b  when 
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< ≤ β . This condition is satisfied when 
M












< ≤ β . Thus, the patentee is more likely to induce infringement by choosing the maximum 
patent breadth when α  is large, β  is small, b
~
 is large and 
M
p Π  is small.  
   The above results show that the smaller are the monopoly profits that the patentee makes 
when his patent is found valid at trial, the greater is the patentee’s incentive to claim the maximum 
breadth of protection and risk having his patent revoked. This occurs because under infringement 






= ) so the greater is 
patent breadth, the further away from the patentee the entrant locates and the greater are the profits 
at the last stage of the game for both players. Thus, in this case, the effect of the loss of monopoly 
profits due to the large patent breadth is smaller than the effect of the increased profits brought by 
the increased level of differentiation between the two products. The reverse is true for large values 
of the monopoly profits.   
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  Having determined the optimal patent breadth decision and the patentee’s expected profits 
when he induces infringement and non infringement the next step to the analysis is to determine 
when the patentee will find it optimal to induce infringement or non infringement. Figure 6 depicts 
the possible outcomes of a comparison between the patentee’s expected profits when he induces 
infringement and his profits when he induces non infringement when the optimal patent breadth 
under inducement of infringement is  e b b
I + =
~
 (panel (i)) and  1 =
I b  (panel (ii)). 
 
  Even though a direct comparison of the patentee’s profits when he induces infringement and 
when he induces non infringement is not possible without knowledge of the values of the 
parameters that affect the patent breadth decision, i.e., β , α , 
M
p Π ,  e C and  p C , we can observe the 
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Figure 6. The Patentee’s Expected Profits under Infringement and his Profits under 









































 – for a proof see the Appendix). This result occurs because the only 
chance the patentee has to realize monopoly profits is when his patent is infringed and its validity is 
upheld during the infringement trial. At the same time, as expected, the greater are the patentee’s 



















 – for a proof see the Appendix).  
4.  Concluding Remarks 
Existing studies have limited the analysis of the innovator’s patenting behavior to the study of his 
decision to patent or not to patent his innovation. The innovator’s patent breadth decision that 
affects, whether the patent will be granted, the breadth of protection granted and the viability of the 
patent after grant and thus determines the innovation rents that can be captured with the patent, have 
not been explicitly modeled in the literature. Instead, it has been traditionally assumed that the 
innovator will apply for the broadest protection possible. 
In this paper a simple game theoretic model is used to describe the patenting behavior of an 
innovator who, having invented a patentable drastic product innovation and having decided to seek 
patent protection, determines the breadth of protection that maximizes the appropriability of the 
innovation rents enabled by the patent. To determine the optimal breadth of patent protection 
claimed, the patentee acts strategically, choosing the breadth of protection that induces the desired 
behavior by the entrant. The patentee is foresighted and anticipates that he may have to incur costs 
to enforce and/or defend his patent rights. The model suggests that the breadth of patent protection  
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that maximizes the innovators ability to appropriate innovation rents, depends on the entrant’s R&D 
cost structure, the patentee’s and the entrant’s trial costs and the effect that patent breadth has on the 
probability that the validity of the patent will be upheld during an infringement/validity trial.  
Contrary to what it is traditionally assumed, the results show that it is not always optimal for 
the patentee to claim the maximum patent breadth possible. In fact, only for certain values of the 
parameters that determine the patent breadth decision it is optimal for the patentee to claim the 
maximum breadth of patent protection. The patentee claims maximum patent protection when he 
cannot deter entry and the entrant’s R&D effectiveness and trial costs are such that she always finds 
it optimal to not infringe the patent (i.e., when the entrant’s R&D costs are very low). The 
maximum breadth of patent protection may also be claimed when the patentee cannot deter entry 
and he finds it optimal to induce infringement. This case occurs, however, only for relatively small 
monopoly profits and when the entrant’s R&D costs are very low. 
The results hold under the assumption of a fencepost patent system, which implies that the 
events that the patent is infringed and the patent is invalid can be treated as mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. In addition, it has been assumed that the market can only support two products, and that 
the R&D process is deterministic. Relaxing the above assumptions is the focus of future research.   
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≥ β , ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ α  ∧  0 ≥ e C . The condition 
1
~
≤ b  is satisfied for certain combinations of β , α  and  e C  values. To determine the combinations of β , 
α  and  e C  values which satisfy the condition  1
~
≤ b , the pairs of β , α  and  e C  values that satisfy the above 
constraint as an equality ( 1
~
= b ) are determined first. The solution of  0 1
~





2 2 + −
= e C . The combination of β  and  e C  values, for a given α  value, for which  0 1
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= − b   
is represented by the locus  1
~
= b  in Figure 3. The area to the right of the locus  1
~
= b  represents all  
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combinations of β  and  e C  values, for a given α  value, for which  1
~
< b . If b
~
 exists it must also satisfy the 
conditions 0 )
~
( > Π b
NI
e  and  0 ))
~
( ( > Π b E
I
e . Thus, b
~
 must take values in the interval  NI I b b b ˆ ~ ˆ < <  –  b
~
 
must not satisfy the entry deterrence condition. To determine the combination of β , α  and  e C  values for 
which  NI I b b b ˆ ~ ˆ < <  the locus  NI I b b ˆ ˆ =  must first be determined. The locus  NI I b b ˆ ˆ =  depicted in Figure 3 









=  holds true. Solution of the above 







= e C . All combinations of β  and  e C  values, for a given α  
value, below the locus  NI I b b ˆ ˆ =  are such that  NI I b b b ˆ ~ ˆ < < .  
  Given the above, b
~
 exists for all combinations of β  and  e C  values, for a given α  value, in the 
area below the locus  1
~
= b  and below the locus  NI I b b ˆ ˆ =  represented by the vertically hatched area in Figure 
3. This case is also depicted in Figure 2, panel (iv).  
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